Endnotes
1 This article is a revised and updated version of “To Link or Not To Link? Turkey-Armenia
Normalization and the Karabakh Conflict”, Caucasus International, Vol. 2, No. 1 (Spring
2012), pp. 53-62. The author thanks the editorial board of Caucasus International for their
reprint permission.

2 In this article, “Karabakh” refers to all the territories that are the focus of conflict, including
the territory of what was known as the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (Region)
in Soviet times and the territories around Nagorno-Karabakh that are presently occupied
by Armenian forces. “Nagorno-Karabakh” refers to the territory of the Soviet-era Nagorno-
Karabakh Autonomous Oblast.

3 “Turkish PM Sets Conditions to Armenia Reconciliation: Report”, Agence France Presse, 10
April 2009.

4 US Department of State, “Press Statement: Turkey and Armenia: Normalization of Relations”,
at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2009/04/122065.htm [last visited 22 January 2013].

5 ANS TV (Baku), 13 May 2009.

6 U.S. Department of State, “Remarks With Armenian Foreign Minister H.E. Edward
Nalbandian After Their Meeting”, at http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2009a/09/129687.
htm [last visited 12 January 2012].

7 Armenian forces captured a smaller amount of territory, the so-called “Lachin corridor”,
outside Nagorno-Karabakh in 1992, and additional territories later in the war. For a history
of the Karabakh conflict, see, Thomas de Waal, Black Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan
Through Peace and War, New York, NYU Press, 2003.

8 “Turk Says Russia is Tangled in Caucasus War”, New York Times, 15 April 1993.

9 Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Joint Statement of The Ministries of
Foreign Affairs of The Republic of Turkey, The Republic of Armenia and The Swiss Federal
Department of Foreign Affairs”, at http://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_-56_-22-april-2009_-pressrelease-
regarding-the-turkish-armenian-relations.en.mfa [last visited 28 January 2013].

10 The protocols are available at http://www.mfa.gov.tr/sub.en.mfa?93e41cc9-832f-4ec7-a629-
a920bfdbb432.

11 See, the two US Department of State statements that opened this article, as well as,
“President Serzh Sargsyan met in Prague with the President of Turkey, Abdullah Gül”, Office
to the President of the Republic of Armenia ,at http://www.president.am/en/press-release/
item/2009/05/07/news-511/ [last visited 03 February 2013].

12 See, for example, Charles Recknagel and Andrew Tully, “Turkey Signals Opening to
Armenia Must Include Nagorno-Karabakh Process”, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, at
http://www.rferl.org/content/Turkey_Signals_Opening_To_Armenia_Must_Include_
NagornoKarabakh_Progress/1613844.html [last visited 21 January 2012]; “Turkey Still
Committed to Preconditions in Armenia Talks”, Asbarez, at http://asbarez.com/68790/
220
Cory Welt
turkey-%e2%80%98still-committed%e2%80%99-to-armenia-talks-with-preconditions/
[last visited 22 January 2012].

13 Turkish President Abdullah Gül avoided making explicit statements linking the two
processes and did not attempt to debunk the notion put forward by Armenian president
Serzh Sarkisian in May 2009 that the two had agreed to “move forward with normalization
without preconditions and within a reasonable time frame”. See the two US Department
of State statements that opened this article, as well as “President Serzh Sargsyan met in
Prague with the President of Turkey, Abdullah Gül”, Office to the President of the Republic
of Armenia, at http://www.president.am/en/press-release/item/2009/05/07/news-511/ [last
visited 03 February 2013].

14 See, for example, “Little Fun for Soccer Fans, Giant Leap for Rapprochement”, Today’s
Zaman, 13 October 2009.

15 In particular, the suspicion was that the Turkish government had agreed to declare the formal
start of the normalisation process only to avoid a vote in the US Congress on recognizing
Armenian genocide claims. Many believed it was no coincidence that the Turkish-Armenian
statement was issued just two days before the annual 24 April commemoration. For an
expression of such suspicion prior to the signing of the protocols, see the US Congressional
letter reprinted in Armenian National Committee of Armenia, “Over 80 House Members
Slam Turkey’s Reversal on Proposed ‘Roadmap’”, at http://www.anca.org/press_releases/
press_releases.php?prid=1745 [last visited 12 January 2013].

16 The last publicly available statement of the Basic Principles is the Organization for the
Security and Cooperation in Europe, “Statement by the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chair
Countries”, at http://www.osce.org/item/51152 [last visited 20 January 2013].

17 The text of the constitutional court’s ruling is available at http://www.concourt.am/english/
decisions/common/pdf/850.pdf [last visited 08 January 2013]; The text of Armenia’s
declaration of independence is available at http://www.gov.am/en/independence/ [last
visited 08 January 2013].

18 For a detailed account of the rise and fall of the Protocols, see, David L. Phillips, Diplomatic
History: The Turkey-Armenia Protocols, New York, Columbia University, Institute for the
Study of Human Rights, March 2012; Also see, Alexander Iskandaryan and Sergei Minasyan,
“Pragmatic Policies vs. Historical Constraints: Analyzing Armenia-Turkey Relations”,
Caucasus Institute Research Papers, No. 1 (January 2010); Aybars Görgülü, Alexander
Iskandaryan and Sergei Minasyan, “Assessing the Rapprochment Process”, TESEV Foreign
Policy Programme- Turkey-Armenia Dialogue Series, May 2010; D. Nigar Göksel, “Turkey and
Armenia Post-Protocols: Back to Square One?”, TESEV Foreign Policy Programme, Istanbul,
Turkey, October 2012.

19 “Joint press conference of Ilham Aliyev and Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan
was held”, at http://en.president.az/articles/6053 [last visited 27 December 2012].

20 See, U.S. Department of State, “The U.S. Relationship With Central Europe Under
the Obama Administration”, at http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/2011/157707.htm
[last visited 12 January 2013]; “The United States and Turkey: A View from the Obama
221
Turkish-Armenian Normalisation and the Karabakh Conflict
Administration”, at www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/2010/138446.htm [last visited 12 January
2013].

21 To these justifications might be added two others that could help explain US support for
dropping conditionality: responsiveness to domestic lobbying and a possible opportunity to
shift the balance of influence in the Caucasus away from Russia and toward the West. These,
however, have not been publicly articulated justifications.

22 See, Thomas de Waal, “Armenia and Turkey: Bridging the Gap”, Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, at http://carnegieendowment.org/2010/10/05/armenia-and-turkeybridging-
gap/22p [last visited 25 January 2013].

23 Information about the project is available at http://armturkdialogue.net/. Also see, Sinem
Cengiz, “Turkish, Armenian Journalists Want the Border Opened”, Today’s Zaman, 3 June
2012; Susanne Güsten, “Using Cheese To Bridge the Turkey-Armenia Gap”, The New York
Times, 24 October 2012; Göksel, “Turkey and Armenia Post-Protocols: Back to Square
One?”. On a separate EU-funded collaborative film endeavour by the UK-based NGO
Conciliation Resources, see, Laurence Broers, “Turks, Armenians and Azeris: Mirrors and
Memories”, Journal of Conflict Transformation (Caucasus Edition), 1 November 2012, at
http://caucasusedition.net/analysis/turks-armenians-and-azeris-mirrors-and-memories [last
visited 12 January 2013].

24 On the “constructive ambiguity” of the Basic Principles, see, Thomas de Waal, “The
Karabakh Trap: Dangers and Dilemmas of the Nagorny Karabakh Conflict”, Conciliation
Resources, December 2008, p. 10.

25 “Opening speech by Ilham Aliyev at the meeting of the Cabinet of Ministers”, at http://
en.president.az/articles/4105 [last visited 22 December 2012]. In an earlier interview with
Russian state television, President Aliyev also said that the determination of final status
“could happen in one year, maybe in ten years, or in 100 years, or this could never happen.
Time will tell”, Azertag, at http://www.azertag.com/ru/newsarchive?mod=1&date=2009-
7-6&id=252&partition=1 [last visited 11 December 2012]. The quotation is cited in
translation in, “Nagorno-Karabagh: Getting to a Breakthrough”, International Crisis Group,
Europe Briefing No. 55 (October 2009), p. 7.

26 See, for instance, the discussion of “interim status” in, Conciliation Resources, “Beyond
Exclusion: Rethinking Approaches to Status in the Nagorno Karabakh Peace Process”,
Discussion Paper (February 2012).

27 On problematising the issue of “return” and a discussion of restitution and other alternatives,
see Gerard Toal, “Return and its Alternatives: International Law, Norms and Practices,
and Dilemmas of Ethnocratic Power, Implementation, Justice and Development” and the
other contributions in Forced Displacement in the Nagorny Karabakh Conflict: Return and its
Alternatives, London, Conciliation Resources, August 2011.

28 See, Conciliation Resources, “Beyond Exclusion”, p. 7.

Այս նյութի համար տեղադրված բովանդակություն չկա:
Ցանկության դեպքում ուղարկեք հարցում և մեր մասնագետները կարճ ժամանակում կուղարկեն Ձեզ անրաժեշտ ինֆորմացիյան: